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ABSTRACT
Seen from the historical-cultural perspective, theoretical
models of modernity, still present in law, are anachronistic before
the increasingly complex and dynamic contemporary reality. In
this scenario, and with the aim of providing a renewal of Brazilian
Civil Law, the 2002 Civil Code was developed with several
general clauses. Among them is the general clause of objective
good faith and in the midst of its practical uses is its role in
establishing the “attached duties”. The doctrine that discusses this
topic, however, runs counter to the epistemological assumptions
adopted in this study and thereby is insufficient and contradictory
in relation to the understanding of today's contractual reality.
Therefore, it is important to build a new rationale for objective
good faith, starting from the critical-methodological approach. In
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this perspective, there is the need to think of an inter partes general
duty. This, in turn, should find its foundation on cooperation and
solidarity, in view of the prospective constitutionalization of the
national civil law and the quest for civil law as an effective tool of
autonomous but responsible human fulfillment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal phenomenon, a cultural product of humanity, has an
inherent connection with the standards which exist at any given
place or time. In addition to political and sociological thought, it is
closely related to the dominant concepts within a historical and
social context, and obtains from this context the vectors that will
illuminate the development of its basic concepts. 1 In this sense,
law was perceived in different ways at various historical moments
in Western civilization—after all, the Roman jurist’s approach
towards legal issues was very different from that of the medieval
jurist, whose attitude, in turn, differed from that of the modern age
jurist. 2 Therefore, and in view of the aim of the research project
proposed by the advisor for this sub-project, the contemporary
jurist, without losing sight of contributions of the past legal
thought, must also assume his historicity. He should also seek to
respond to new demands—arising out of the progression of
society—in a way that is consistent with the cultural context in
which he operates.
In this sense, it may be asserted that theoretical models
constructed in modernity, characteristic of the industrial age, are in
crisis because they no longer match the current reality, which is
marked by pluralism, cultural and economic globalization, and the

1. Nelson Saldanha, Sobre o “direito civil constitucional”: notas sobre a
crise do classicismo jurídico, 36 REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UFPR
87-92 (2001).
2. ANTÓNIO CASTANHEIRA NEVES, 1 DIGESTA: ESCRITOS ACERCA DO
DIREITO, DO PENSAMENTO JURÍDICO, DA SUA METODOLOGIA E OUTROS 12-13
(Coimbra Editora 2010) [hereinafter DIGESTA VOL. 1].
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complexity of the social texture. 3 Thus, the mathematical concept
of law is unfounded. That concept identified law as a closed
system through which legal reasoning was regulated by logical
deduction and whose applied methodology had a markedly
exegetical nature. Now, legal thought must take account of a new
epistemological paradigm, characterized by complexity, and that
challenges the truths and dogmas established by traditional legal
doctrine. 4
Given this renewed view of reality, and in the face of the need
to readjust legal thought, new legislative techniques have arisen, of
which the general clauses are a powerful example. Due to the
imprecise meaning caused by vague terminology and expressions
contained in their normative hypotheses, these clauses have the
function of making the legal system more open and flexible to new
social demands. 5 The current Civil Code of 2002 was prepared
precisely in this spirit and, for this reason, is filled with general
clauses which, in theory, favor the approximation of the legal text
to the mutability of everyday human relations.
Specifically in the field of civil law, the general clause of
objective good faith reflects such a systematic opening, and
determines a range of developments not only in the obligational
and contractual context, but also in civil law as a whole. 6 That is
because “the advancement of civil law, in terms of concrete
solutions during the present century, is due to the recourse to good
faith” 7 and “at present, the growth areas of civil law . . . keep
connected with good faith.” 8
3. Francisco Amaral, O direito civil na pós-modernidade in DIREITO CIVIL:
61-77 (Bruno Torquato de Oliveira Naves, César Fiuza, & Maria
de Fátima Freire de Sá (coords.), Del Rey 2003).
4. Francisco Amaral, O direito civil no paradigma da complexidade, 40/41
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE DIREITO COMPARADO 67-68 (1º e 2º sem, 2011).
5. Francisco Amaral, Objeto e método no direito civil brasileiro, 36
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE DIREITO COMPARADO 35 (1º sem., 2009).
6. CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (Brasil), art. 422 (2002).
7. MENEZES CORDEIRO, DA BOA FÉ NO DIREITO CIVIL 396 (1st ed., 3d
reprint, Almedina 2007).
8. Id. at 397.
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Amidst the multiple purposes of the above clause, its role in
establishing duties for the parties during the existence of the
contract stands out. However, such duties, according to traditional
doctrine would have only an ancillary, attached, integrative or
parallel function to contractual obligations. In other words, they
would simply be a means of providing correct progress or an
optimization to the unfolding of the contractual relationship, 9
acting to assist in the development of obligational prestations
contractually established.
However, if there is recognition that the duties established
because of objective good faith are housed in much deeper levels
of law based on the very nature of good faith as the “general vector
of the legal system,” 10 how does one speak of it as having a merely
auxiliary nature? After all, if concrete solutions based on good
faith express a true return to the ultimate purposes of law, 11 it
seems appropriate to reflect on the profound role of this institution,
as opposed to the strictly ancillary action of the duties extracted
from it. More than that, it is necessary to investigate to which areas
of the legal life good faith allegedly connects and are manifested in
its realization. Such investigations, because of the growing
phenomenon of constitutionalization of the Brazilian Civil Law,
require conjugation with the fundamental objective of “building a
free, just and solidary society,” 12 and the republican foundation of
the dignity of the human person. 13
II. OBJECTIVES
Having demarcated the assumptions and issues of this research,
we stress that the study of the proposed theme hints at the need to
9. Id. at 592; JUDITH MARTINS-COSTA, A BOA-FÉ NO DIREITO PRIVADO:
SISTEMA E TÓPICA NO PROCESSO OBRIGACIONAL 440 (1st ed., 2d prtg, Revista
dos Tribunais 2000).
10. CORDEIRO, supra note 7, at 395.
11. CORDEIRO, supra note 7, at 341.
12. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] (Brasil), art. 3, I. (1988).
13. Id. at art.1, III. (1988).
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identify not accessory duties imposed by objective good faith, but
a general duty which is consistent with the socio-cultural
fluctuations impacting contracts and civil law as a whole. Thus, the
research sub-project is aimed primarily at determining whether,
from objective good faith and the plexus of utilities that it
represents, it would be possible to extract the idea of a general duty
of cooperation and solidarity to be observed by the parties in the
course of the contractual relationship. Moreover, the study seeks to
determine if such a duty represents a need in current Brazilian law
that the parties cooperate during contract performance in the name
of objective good faith and based on solidary constitutional
dictates.
As for specific objectives proposed in the original sub-project,
it is possible to summarize them as follows: (i) to deepen the
understanding of the social context of post-modernity that arises as
a backdrop to the changes undergone by law—such a purpose, as
discussed in the results and discussion section, was vitally
important to guide the improvement of conclusions; and (ii) to
understand the relevance of objective good faith in establishing a
possible general duty of cooperation and solidarity—a duty
founded on constitutional dictates—investigating the limits and
limitations of such theoretical construct.
These are the objectives of this sub-project, which are expected
to have been achieved successfully and consistently from the
methodology applied and theoretical references used.
III. METHODOLOGY
This research adopted the critical-methodological line of
investigation, 14 as it was done based on theses that have emerged
from the developments affecting both legal thought and the
methodology of realization of law in post-modernity. Within this
14. MARIA TEREZA FONSECA DIAS & MIRACY BARBOSA DE SOUSA
GUSTON, (RE)PENSANDO A PESQUISA JURÍDICA: TEORIA E PRÁTICA 20-21 (Del
Rey 2006).
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line, we have chosen the legal-theoretical perspective, 15 to
delineate a possible new duty, of general character, from the
comparison between the theoretical constructs already made about
objective good faith and the new demands arising from social
practice. Therefore, the rationale employed was based on the
vision of law as a practical science, focused on its implementation
and the effective solution to concrete problems. Moreover, legalexploratory and legal-interpretative types of research were
conducted to outline an initial overview of the problem and, from
that, to interpret the data of legal reality and its needs. 16
Having presented the perspectives adopted in the development
of the sub-project, we emphasize that the reflection on the theme
was based primarily on bibliographical research in the works cited
herein. Books and papers of importance in regard to contracts and
objective good faith were used. The highlights are the works of
António Manuel da Rocha Menezes Cordeiro (2007) and Judith
Martins-Costa (1999), which are references required on this
subject, and also those books that helped us understand the legal
phenomenon in a way that was largely different from the one that
guided us in the beginning of this research. Emphasis is placed on
the study of the writings of Francisco Amaral and António
Castanheira Neves, 17 whose ius-philosophical ponderings largely
contributed to rethinking the current sense of law and its problems,
promoting the investigation of the reflexes of these meditations on
the results of this sub-project.
In addition, meetings between the advisor and members of the
research group linked to the main project were conducted during
which it was possible to exchange information of mutual relevance
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 28-29.
17. Arising from the study of the thought of this philosopher of Portuguese
law, the following summary, presented orally at the I Semana Científica do
Direito UFES, was produced: Laio Portes Sthel & Morgana Neves de Jesus, A
razão prática como uma solução possível para a atualcrise do Direito, SEMANA
CIENTÍFICA DO DIREITO UFES: GRADUAÇÃO E PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO (2012),
avialable at www.periodicos.ufes.br/ppgdir-semanajuridica/article/view/9810.
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for the advisees and to obtain input from debates and discussions
aimed at better understanding law in the current historical and
cultural context as well as understanding its reverberations on the
theme of this sub-project.
Finally, it is noted that due to the highly theoretical direction
given to this research, the jurisprudential research proposed in the
sub-project became unnecessary. For this reason, the research on
the rulings of the Superior Court of Justice was not carried out, in
order to maintain consistency with the search for legal and
theoretical foundations for the proposed theme.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Just as the legal phenomenon is not divorced from the
historical and cultural reality that surrounds it, in light of what was
already presented in the introduction of this report, so objective
good faith must also be observed from the perspective of a certain
understanding of law in space and time. As Menezes Cordeiro
asserts, good faith cannot be reduced to the idea of a common legal
institution, but rather expresses the completeness of an “. . .
important cultural factor, linked closely to a certain understanding
of the legal phenomenon.” 18 Given the depth and relevance of
Cordeiro’s study, it is worth investigating this Portuguese jurist’s
understanding of law and good faith as well as his contributions to
the overall comprehension of good faith and of the panorama
surrounding it.
In the introduction to his work, Menezes Cordeiro lays the
epistemological postulates on which he will build the development
of his thought about good faith. From the defense of legal
dogmatics and of the eminently scientific character of law, the
Portuguese jurist explains that every legal phenomenon is positive
and that although it is not exhausted in the legal order given,

18. CORDEIRO, supra note 7, at 371.
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dogmatics plants its roots in the same positiveness. 19 Thus, even if
good faith does not conform to the classical subsumptive
interpretation/application, and even if it is impossible to define it in
legal and positive terms—the role of jurisprudence being to fill its
content in the concrete case—good faith should be seen in a
dogmatic way to escape from what the author calls a
methodological unreality and the ensuing mythification of this civil
institution.20 These phenomena, pointed out and criticized by the
author under discussion, emanate from the difficulty of the
scientific understanding of the developments concerning good faith
obtained from jurisprudence: the jurists who proposed to study it
are guided by merely formal, grandiose propositions that do not
provide sufficient material criteria for a decision, which therefore
leads to mythification of the concept of objective good faith—i.e.,
an institution “. . . where all hopes are possible.” 21
Thus, to circumvent these methodological difficulties, Menezes
Cordeiro starts from German jurisprudence in order to extract the
duties that the parties must observe in the unfolding of the
contractual relationship, establishing a tripartite division into duties
of protection, loyalty and information or clarification. 22 However,
he points out that the duty of protection, as it is designed in a
unified way by German legal thought, has no applicability in legal
systems where there is the possibility of extracting the same
practical result from the rules relating to extra-contractual
liability, 23 as is the case of Brazil. 24
Therefore, it is possible to infer that the attached duties would
be restricted to the others: (i) loyalty—the duty to assume behavior
that provides an accurate and honest negotiation, encompassing
duties of care, confidentiality and consequent action, and (ii)
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 41-43.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 603-607.
Id. at 636-37.
See C.C., art. 186 (2002).
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information or clarification—the duty to provide all information
necessary for the contract to be finalized and performed honestly. 25
The consideration of these duties emerges from the alreadyconsolidated visualization of the intra-obligational complexity that
surpasses the traditional bipolar view of debit and credit to
recognize the obligation as a reality also composed of other
elements. 26 Thus, besides the main prestation, embodied in human
behavior to be performed by the debtor in favor of the creditor,
there would exist various other material operations and conducts to
be taken by the contracting parties—among them compliance with
certain legal requirements, such as the attached duties of objective
good faith. 27
Incidentally, as Menezes Cordeiro puts it, the nature of these
duties under discussion is essentially legal, because objective good
faith comes from within the positive legal system, i.e., it reminds
all under its jurisdiction that we are still dealing with the
application of positive law and its science. 28 Moreover, the same
author argues that to achieve good faith, it is necessary to bear in
mind two principles: the protection of trust and the materiality of
legal regulation. The first principle turns to the protection of
legitimate expectations generated in the other contracting party or
adherence to representations that this party deems effective, 29
while the second principle represents the fight against legal
formalism and its blind obedience to the legal rules and against
pure syllogism. 30 These would, in short, be the vectors to be
followed in achieving good faith in cases being decided.
As one can see, Menezes Cordeiro does not shun the idea that
law is essentially positive and therefore systematic, even if it is still

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

CORDEIRO, supra note 7, at 583.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 590-91.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1252.
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an open, mobile, heterogeneous and cybernetic system. 31 In this
conception, good faith appears as a legal element that provides the
entry of extra-systematic elements into the set of prescriptive
propositions legally established, enriching the legal system and
allowing its malleability when facing concrete cases. The attached
duties thus would be inserted into this dogmatic conception of law,
serving as a way to model contractual relationships in the senses
that the legal system itself and its ultimate purposes would provide.
Judith Martins-Costa, another prominent name in the study of
objective good faith, understands the matter in a similar fashion.
We will now discuss her views in order to complete the study of
the state of the art the theme is in the dominant legal thought. In
fact, the above-mentioned Brazilian jurist sees good faith as a
useful way to “. . . the construction of a substantial sense of law,
acting as a model able to develop an open system . . .” 32—or
rather, a relatively open system or a system of relative selfreference, since the full opening could result in an incongruent desystematization. 33
Thus, objective good faith, set in a general clause in the civil
code, could cause this systematic opening of the legal system—
making it porous to the insertion of elements then regarded as
extra-legal. At the same time, good faith would generate an
internal mobility. That is, it would provide the return or reforwarding of the solution given in the concrete case to the
provisions within the legal system. 34 Effectively, according to the
author mentioned, objective good faith should be praised for
dispensing with the closed design of law, allowing, in addition to
this internal system modification, a re-systematization of the
elements which escape the boundaries of positive legal rules,
31.
63.
32.
33.
34.

To better understand these terms, see CORDEIRO, supra note 7, at 1260MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 9, at 382.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 341.
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rearranging them within the very system. 35 Consequently, from
this line of thinking, it follows that objective good faith would
favor an intermittent readjustment and a constant innovation of
law.
With respect to the attached duties themselves, Martins-Costa
is also guided by the changes in the obligational process to
substantiate their existence. She adds, thus, that the obligational
relationship must be seen through the prism of its intrinsic
dynamics, from an overall and process-based view of the
obligation: this would “. . . encompass, in a permanent flow, all the
vicissitudes, ‘cases’ and problems that may be taken to it—[an
obligation] that moves processually, once invented and developed
in light of a purpose . . . .” 36 Among these events are the attached,
accessory or instrumental duties, whose dependence on the specific
case for their determination and consequent changeability is
stressed by Martins-Costa with the aim of justifying—unlike
Menezes Cordeiro—her preference for not reducing and
numbering them dogmatically. In fact, the quoted jurist lays out an
illustrative list of such duties, into which she even inserts a duty of
“collaboration and cooperation” and refers to the fact that such
duties, in general, are called “duties of cooperation and protection
of mutual interests.” 37
For the application of the general clause of objective good faith
and, consequently, to determine the duties to be followed by
contracting parties in a specific case, Martins-Costa defends a
required distance from the axiomatic-deductive method: in her
opinion, the most appropriate methodology to be adopted is
juridical topics coming from Theodor Vieweg’s theories. 38
Although criticized by Menezes Cordeiro, 39 “topic reasoning” is
presented by Martins-Costa as essentially problem-oriented (and
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 22, 369.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 355 et seq.
CORDEIRO, supra note 7, at 1132 et seq.
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therefore operative and pragmatic), conforming very well to the
way objective good faith demands its implementation, 40 without
abandoning the systematic thinking altogether. Both are
complementarily dialectical and are at the root of the development
of an open system. 41
Thus, comparatively, it is observed that while maintaining the
defense of a distinct methodology for the realization of objective
good faith and the “attached duties”, both authors based their
epistemological assumptions on similar pillars. Menezes Cordeiro
is firm in the conviction that the principles of materiality of legal
regulation and trust must be adopted as guiding tools for the
achievement of objective good faith, whereas Martins-Costa
prefers juridical topics for achieving this desideratum. Here lie
some of the main difficulties encountered during the research
proposed by the sub-project: the jurists discussed here,
representatives of the dominant legal current on the subject, see
objective good faith from a dogmatic and systematic view of the
legal phenomenon, nevertheless they start from an open
understanding of this phenomenon. This way, even though both
reject the mere subsumptive logic of application of law, their
conceptions collide with the gnosiological bases already outlined
in the introduction to this report, which illuminated the
continuation of this research and the studies conducted between the
advisor and advisees. Thus, as we search for a different foundation
for objective good faith, it is imperative to note how contractual
reality and its underlying economic dimension—regulated by such
institution and its attached duties—have been faced.
Like any legal institution, the contract is subject to what can be
termed as “. . . the principle of historical relativity . . . .” 42 This is
meant to say that the contract is also subject to historical
40. MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 9, at 371-72.
41. Id. at 376-77.
42. ENZO ROPPO, O CONTRATO 347-48 (Ana Coimbra & M. Januário C.
Gomes trans., Almedina 2009).
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contingencies that mark its understanding. And any position
intending to establish an alleged unitary and universal “essence” of
contract, extracted from a single strand of legal knowledge, is open
to criticism. In fact, today the fragmentation that permeates
postmodern contract theory is recognizable; as the contract is
marked by varied facets, it becomes impractical to obtain a concept
that is unique and revealing of its structure. 43 Even the
standardization of exchanges do not determine the “death” of the
contract, but the readjustment of its discipline in face of today's
dynamic socio-economic requirements. 44
This, however, does not preclude the possibility to outline
some general lines of the profile of contracts. These, incidentally,
are traditionally defined as “. . . two or more parties agreeing to
constitute, regulate or extinguish a legal patrimonial
relationship.” 45 Thus, the patrimonial nature, or better, the
economic nature is the element that marks the contract, as the
contract is realized solely in relationships that have the economic
nature as their basic component. 46 This does not mean that the
contractual universe is tied to a mere idea of exchange; a donation,
for example, is also characterized as being a contract, because it is
also a means of the circulation of wealth.
In this sense, the contract is a genuine legal-formal garment for
economic operations—where such garment is not present, one
cannot identify the existence of a contract. 47 Therefore, as a legal
concept, the contract is intended to regulate the objective
43. Lucas Barroso, A teoria do contrato no paradigma constitucional, 84
REVISTA DE DIREITO DO CONSUMIDOR 163 (2012).
44. PIETRO PERLINGIERI, O DIREITO CIVIL NA LEGALIDADE CONSTITUCIONAL
397 (Maria Cristina De Cicco trans., Renovar 2008).
45. CESARE BIANCA, DERECHO CIVIL: EL CONTRATO 23 (Fernando
Hinestrosa & Édgar Cortés trans., Universidad Externado de Colombia 2007).
(Free translation from Spanish. Original text: “. . .el acuerdo de dos o más
partes para constituir, regular o extinguir entre ellas una relación jurídica
patrimonial”.)
46. LUCAS BARROSO, AMANDA MORRIS, ET. AL., DIREITO DOS CONTRATOS
40 (Revista dos Tribunais 2008).
47. ROPPO, supra note 42, at 11.
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circulation of wealth, whether current or potential, from one person
to another, depending on the direction and organization one wants
to give to the interests involved in the realization of the economic
operations. 48 It is seen, accordingly, that the contract appears as an
instrument immersed in the economic and social context: it is the
legal and formal translation of such context, with a view to the
formation of a complex body of rules that protect the interests of
the contracting parties.
In terms of legislative developments, it is known that the
classical contractual paradigm, derived from the Enlightenment
context of the eighteenth century, influenced the first legal contract
systematics, inserted into the Napoleonic Code of 1804. However,
the strictly conceptual overview outlined earlier did not prevent
contractual theory, since its origin, from playing an ideological
role. The contract actually became “. . . the flag of societies born
out of bourgeois revolutions and, ultimately, an element of their
legitimacy.” 49 So, one understands the deep connection between
the conceptual roots of contract theory and the economic goals of
the emerging bourgeois class, aimed, ultimately, at the
consolidation of the capitalist system as a prevailing mode of
production.
This perspective becomes even more latent when we better
analyze the core of primal contract theory, namely, freedom of
choice, today recognized as private autonomy. 50 To begin with,
private autonomy can be defined as the power by which the legal
system establishes the possibility of holders of rights to determine
the juridicization of their activities, choosing the legal effects to be
48. Id. at 9, 13.
49. Id. at 28.
50. As a result of in-depth studies on private autonomy and its current
problems in face of the concrete contractual relations, we co-authored the
following scientific article for the XXI National Congress of CONPEDI: Jussara
Gomes & Laio Sthel, O atual dilema da autonomia privada: entre a teorética
contratual e a efetividade das práticas sociais in RELAÇÕES PRIVADAS E
DEMOCRACIA 164-83 (Otávio Luiz Rodrigues Jr.; Giordano Bruno Soares
Roberto & Nelson Luiz Pinto (coords.), FUNJAB 2012).
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produced. 51 However, and beyond this purely doctrinal construct,
one sees that, at its root, the defense of autonomy to all individuals
had been determined by the need to declare the freedom of workers
from the bonds that harnessed them to the land of the feudal lords
in order that they might serve as free labor to the rising
bourgeoisie. 52 In the words of Ana Prata, “the connection between
the worker and the means of production is only possible by
agreement between the worker and the owner of these means.” 53
It is noted, however, that the defense of private autonomy and
its legal significance emerged at the time of the final collapse of
feudalism and of the capitalist expansion, thus determining the
universalization of the latter and of other favorable concepts to the
consolidation of this economic system of production. In such
context, the juridical transaction, under which the contract is the
largest exponent, is revealed as true affirmation of individual
freedom and economic freedom of all. 54 However, it must be said
that the exaltation of freedom and equality among individuals, at
that juncture, did not leave the theoretical field; the abstraction of
these principles, in fact, served to conceal the deep substantial
inequalities, in particular relating to the economic and social power
between the parties, so as to disguise the existence of materially
unfair agreements of the will, hence the affirmation of the
ideological function embedded in the origins of the legal construct
of contracts. 55
Thus, having made this historical digression on classical
contract theory and its essential pillar, private autonomy, we need
to emphasize that such a bourgeois-liberal paradigm does not seem
so far away from the civilian legal thought in contemporary times.
51. Diogo de Melo. Princípios do direito contratual: autonomia privada,
relatividade, força obrigatória, consensualismo in TEORIA GERAL DOS
CONTRATOS 82 (Renan Lotufo & Giovanni Nanni (coords.), Atlas 2011).
52. ANA PRATA, A TUTELA CONSTITUCIONAL DA AUTONOMIA PRIVADA 9
(Livraria Almedina 1982).
53. Id. at 8, emphasis added.
54. Id. at 10.
55. ROPPO, supra note 42, at 37-38.
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Indeed, although there is a plurality that permeates the contractual
phenomenon, which is felt in the presence of different paradigms
in action, it is important to point to the fact that, in light of Maria
Luiza Feitosa’s views, the image of the contract extracted from
liberal rationality would still prevail. 56 This author adds that “in
the national context, for example, contracts that objectively fit in
the legal system and do not involve consumer relationships have
not changed, to the point of seeing in that system, the exhaustion of
the classical paradigm.” 57 Thus, the concept of contract as a
meeting of free wills based on a formal freedom and equality
continues to influence civilian doctrine and pertinent legislation.
This fact, in turn, must be taken into account when analyzing
the basis given to objective good faith. Effectively, throughout the
development of the research, the analysis of the contract panorama
proved of great value in that it hinted at how the theory that
embraces it remains imbued, in many respects, with nineteenthcentury liberal-bourgeois individualism. Thus, to affirm the strictly
incidental and integrative nature of the attached duties is to adopt
an acritical position on the very reality with which one is dealing.
After all, if such duties are simple guidelines directed to the “. . .
exact processing of the obligational relationship . . .”, 58 i.e., the
pursuit of contractual purposes embodied in the due performance,
nothing else they will be doing than condone the ideological bias
found in the intricacies of contract theory and which hides the
actual inter partes inequalities.
Following this conclusion, how may law resolve this problem
more fully if it is regarded—in the view adopted by Menezes
Cordeiro—as lacking of a reductionism to become operative in the
face of the growing complexity of modern societies? 59 Now, the
56. MARIA LUIZA PEREIRA DE ALENCAR MAYER FEITOSA, PARADIGMAS
INCONCLUSOS: OS CONTRATOS ENTRE A AUTONOMIA PRIVADA, A REGULAÇÃO
ESTATAL E A GLOBALIZAÇÃO DOS MERCADOS 566 (Coimbra Editora 2007).
57. Id. at 569.
58. MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 9, at 440 (emphasis added by author).
59. CORDEIRO, supra note 7, at 1258.
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legal phenomenon, according to what has been repeatedly asserted
in this report, cannot be taken as the product of an axiomatic and
simplified perspective. Law must essentially confront this
complexity, since it emanated from it. After all, if today's laws no
longer exclusively form a legal statute, becoming the result of
political contingencies and partisan forces, it is necessary,
according to the teachings of António Castanheira Neves, that:
. . . [T]he (committedly) political nature of the legislative
function must have its counter-pole in the (autonomously
legal) nature of the jurisdictional function. In this sense, but
only in this sense, one can speak of the ‘Vom Gesetzesstaat
zum Richterstaat’ evolution (R. Maric) which, since thus
understood, is beyond the question of the (democratic)
legitimacy of the jurisdictional function in terms of its
legally creative manifestations, because it is not a dispute
between powers, it is not even assigning ‘Alle Macht den
Richtern’ and thus the eventual emergence of the
‘government of judges’, but it is to assert law to power, the
possibility to ultimately recognize law as a constitutively
unfailing dimension of the state and so truly [recognize] the
state as rule-of-law. 60
Therefore, if the desire to keep law as an effective counterpoint
to power in its political-legislative manifestation still exists, law
cannot be returned to mere legality, nor to a dogmatics said to be,
paradoxically, open to what is called “meta-legal concepts.” It is
noteworthy that, regarding the author mentioned, not even the
general clauses served to overcome the alienation suffered by
formalist rationality when closing law in on itself. 61
From these conclusions, this research sought to lay a renewed
foundation to objective good faith so that it is observed through a
prism of a practical and jurisprudential analysis in which its
usefulness in the judicative-decisory realization of law becomes a
60. ANTÓNIO CASTANHEIRA NEVES, 3 DIGESTA: ESCRITOS ACERCA DO
DIREITO, DO PENSAMENTO JURÍDICO, DA SUA METODOLOGIA E OUTROS 173
(Coimbra Editora 2010) [hereinafter DIGESTA VOL. 3] (emphasis added by
authors).
61. Id. at 51.

204

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

time of full reach of the major objectives of legal existence.
Bearing in mind the growing movement of constitutionalization of
civil law, in which “values proposed by the Constitution are
present in every corner of the normative fabric,” 62 we recognize
the direct application of constitutional principles to legal
relationships established in a traditional civil rights context.63
Starting from this premise we need, therefore, to reflect on the
influence of the precepts contained in the 1988 Major Law [The
Constitution] on the study of objective good faith and on the
outlining of the duties arising out of it.
Constitutional civil law may be understood as the culmination
of a renewal in the fundamentals of this branch of private law,
favored by the democratic Constitution. Its central axis is the
existential domain of the human being, i.e., the humanization of
national civil law. 64 Thus, by the proclamation of justice and social
solidarity65 and human dignity, 66 the current Constitution helped us
see the demand for democratization of civil law, starting from its
change of basic foundation, i.e., from patrimoniality to the human
person as the ultimate foundation of private law. In this sense one
can say, in the words of Paulo Lôbo, “the restoration of the
primacy of the human person in civil relationships is the first
condition to adapt law to reality and to the constitutional
foundations.” 67 Incidentally, the caveat is that the
constitutionalization of civil law does not intend to eliminate
patrimoniality from relationships regulated by it, but to give them
new significance in favor of a legal protection that is qualitatively
62. Giselda Hironaka, Flávio Tartuce & José Fernando Simão, O código
civil de 2002 e a constituição federal: 5 anos e 20 anos in OS 20 ANOS DA
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL 463-519 (Alexandre
Moraes (coord.), Atlas 2009).
63. PERLINGIERI, supra note 44, at 589.
64. Barroso, supra note 43, at 156, 160.
65. F.C., art.3, I. (1988).
66. F.C., art.1, III. (1988).
67. Paulo Luiz Netto Lôbo, Constitucionalização do direito civil in DIREITO
CIVIL: ATUALIDADES 206 (Bruno Torquato de Oliveira Naves, César Fiuza &
Maria de Fátima Freire de Sá (coords.), Del Rey 2003).
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different, so that the economic situation may serve as support for
people’s full development, and not vice versa. 68
Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize that, to avoid falling
back into a dogmatic legalism, the Brazilian Constitution should
also be seen as a product of historical and political contingencies.
It would not be consistent, therefore, to visualize it absolutely
blindly and acritically. We advocate that the Basic Law, like any
other piece of legislation, be seen as one (not the only) axis of
realization of law and it must justify itself before legal principles
and the concrete case itself. 69 It is in this sense, finally, that the
prospective constitutionalization is accredited, i.e., it firms up the
commitment to the “. . . steady journey that captures the historical,
cultural meanings of codes and rewrites, through the resignification of these linguistic beacons, the limits and the
emancipatory possibilities of law itself.” 70
In this step, the study of objective good faith undertaken in this
research reaps its foundations on such a perspective, since good
faith, as any civil legal institution, cannot escape the social
commitments, already constitutionally assumed. Only then will we
be able to see the importance of objective good faith as a legal
principle governing the exercise of contractual prerogatives by
making private autonomy, and therefore contracts, essentially
subjected to social solidarity. 71 It is in this sense, finally, that the
findings of this research will be established.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Given the relevance of objective good faith in the design of the
current profile of today’s contracts, 72 its study becomes important
68. PERLINGIERI, supra note 44, at 121-22.
69. NEVES, DIGESTA VOL. 1, supra note 2, at 48.
70. Luiz Edson Fachin, Apresentação to 2 APONTAMENTOS CRÍTICOS PARA
O DIREITO CIVIL BRASILEIRO CONTEMPORÂNEO 13 (Eroulths Cortiano Júnior;
Jussara Maria Leal de Meirelles &Paulo Nalin (coords.), Juruá 2009).
71. BIANCA, supra note 45, at 57.
72. FEITOSA, supra note 56, at 557.
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due to the sense that one wants to give to contractual relations and
their underlying economic transactions. At the end of this research,
it is therefore possible to summarize the conclusions as follows:
1) The systematic understanding of objective good faith
intended to emphasize its importance in the methodological
renewal of the realization of law, from a dogmatic bias and
therefore, reductionist. However, we hope to have demonstrated
that the current human reality is much more complex and dynamic
than the legal system can assume. The legal system will always be
doubly exceeded, either by the principles that determine the
evaluative agenda of the community project, or by the historical
reality that it is intended. 73 Thus, the understanding of objective
good faith must be based on another perspective which is
historical-problematic and that effectively put civil law and its
institutions at the service of the human person.
2) The doctrine of attached duties becomes insufficient and
barely profitable when contrasted with the epistemological
assumptions on which this research was based. Indeed, to defend
the idea that duties coming out of objective good faith have an
ancillary nature is to serve the mere achievement of individualistic
purposes of contracts. Therefore, the end result is corroborating
with the old classical liberal paradigm that still permeates the
dominant contractual theory, without having a critical perspective
on actual reality regulated.
3) To avoid this problematic subordination of good faith to
classical contract theory, it is therefore necessary to enforce a
general duty that—beyond purely individualistic impulses of the
parties—stands as an actual curb to private autonomy. In view of
the foregoing, it is concluded that the perspective outlined at the
end of this research can provide the concept of objective good faith
as an ethical-normative element of effective re-signification of

73. NEVES, DIGESTA VOL. 1, supra note 2, at 47.
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contractual relations established in our times, serving as a
sufficient basis for what is advocated here.
4) This general duty, in view of the increasing
constitutionalization of civil law, should pass through the ideals of
solidarity and cooperation, so that the contracting parties seek the
satisfaction of their goals with concern for the legal position of the
other. It is in this sense that economicity, inherent to the idea of
economic transactions to which the contracts serve as a legal
garment, must follow. Only then may objective good faith be
consistent with the renewal suffered by civil law, especially in
regard to the search for its concept as an instrument of autonomous
but responsible human fulfillment.

